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NOTE DE L’ÉDITEUR
Translated from the French original by Jonathan Hall
1 The  central  argument  of  this  volume  by  Bo  Zhiyue  concerns the  mobility  of  the
provincial elites in China since 1949. This places it in the field of investigations into
contemporary China known as elite studies, a field which has greatly expanded since the
pioneering  work  of  Roberto  Scalapino1.  Subsequently,  the  proliferation  of  available
Chinese sources, coupled with the country’s increasingly rationalised procedures for
leadership appointments, have made this question a legitimate object of research. A
whole series of publications have reinvigorated the sociological study of the Chinese
elites2.  A  recent  and  significant  initiative  has  been  the  establishment  of  the  China
Leadership Monitor3. This brings together all the latest analyses of the leading figures in
the political system of the People’s Republic.
2 Bo Zhiyue’s work puts him in a direct line of descent from the classical school of elite
studies  of  Vilfredo  Pareto  and  Gaetano  Mosca,  and  he  himself  acknowledges  the
influence  of  William  Clark’s  work  on  the  situation  in  Russia4.  The  supporting
documentation is very solid, enabling the reader to grasp the historical development of
the  system  in  the  provinces  since  1949.  The  work  is  also  impressive  for  the  huge
amount of material it analyses—the Dangdai Zhongguo (Contemporary China) and the
Shengqing (Provincial  Data)  series—and for  the number of  its  case studies  (covering
23,845  official  positions  held  by  2,534  leaders  from  22  provinces,  five  autonomous
regions, and the cities of Peking, Shanghai and Tianjin). Another positive feature is that
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it provides research data on entire elite groups or populations, not on sample surveys.
This research focuses on the holders of leadership positions in the provinces, namely
the appointees as governor and deputy governor, and as Communist Party secretary
and deputy secretary, between 1949 and 1998.
3 Nevertheless, this book comes up sharply against numerous limitations, when it seeks
to distinguish itself  from most of  the accepted theories about the Chinese elites by
relying on a statistical approach which is sometimes confusing and on an excessively
narrow set of criteria: political mobility is only measured against the yardstick of the
provincial leaders’ economic performance.
4 The author categorically rejects the “factional model”5 advanced by Andrew Nathan, as
well  as  Lowell  Dittmer’s  theory  of  “informal  politics”6.  The  latter  theory  takes  the
political uses of interpersonal relations or guanxi as its guiding principle to explain,
with a certain justification, that the operational logic of personal contacts may well be
necessary conditions, but can never be sufficient reasons in themselves, for setting up a
political faction. In addition, Bo Zhiyue maintains that the various political campaigns
since 1979 were not a decisive factor in the political mobility of the provincial leaders.
This position leads him to deny the existence of “localist tendencies”, in opposition to
analyses like those of Li Cheng, David Bachmann and Zang Xiaowei, who testify to the
emergence of such trends after the Communist Party lifted the ban on the recruitment
of leading cadres in their native province. Bo demonstrates that whereas such leaders
made up 50% of the personnel in the 1950s, their number declined steadily until the
early 1980s and rebounded after 1989 to reach a figure of 42% of the total provincial
leadership. His argument is that this phenomenon was a consequence of the low degree
of mobility enjoyed by the social elites in China, or to be more precise, the fact that
advancement  is  primarily  horizontal  or  internal.  Hongwu Ouyang’s  analyses  of  the
turnover in the local leaderships since the mid-1980s confirm that the average length
of a governor’s tenure fell from 39 months between 1949 and 1978, to 32.6 months in
the period since 1986. On average, the reappointment of the provincial leaders takes
place every five years, following the pattern set by the Party Congresses. As for the
mayorships,  according  to  Pierre  Landry’s  studies,  these  are  decided  by  the  central
government about  every 28  months.  However,  Bo Zhiyue points  out  that  of  the  13
deputy  governors  who  were  transferred  between  1990  and  1998,  over  60%  were
promoted to the post of deputy Party Secretary, which shows that the movement of
cadres takes place more between the provinces themselves than outwards from the
centre to the provinces.
5 The author also emphasises that from the 1980s to the 1990s political centralisation was
matched by economic decentralisation. So, unlike Li Cheng’s technocratic model, his
view is  that  the level  of  education is  playing an increasingly important role  in the
appointment of cadres, but not in their mobility. This is because provincial China “is
not ruled by technocrats” but by “generalists”, who are “admittedly better educated
and younger, but not very specialised” according to him.
6 Bo Zhiyue’s main thesis is that the political mobility of a cadre is determined by the
amount of his locality’s financial contribution to the central budget. Referring to the
amount  of  provincial  representation  at  the  central  committee  and  the  politburo
between 1969 and 1997, he attempts to show that the richer a province is, the greater
its  political  power,  and  vice  versa.  The  crucial  factor  is  not  so  much  a  province’s
economic  performance  but  its  contribution  to  the  state  budget.  This  phenomenon
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serves to explain why provincial representation at the centre is primarily under the
control  of  the  richest  municipalities,  followed  by  the  major  provinces,  whose
importance is measured in terms of prosperity, land area and population density.
7 In actual fact, while the theoretical models are challenged by the author do provide as
an inadequate description of the current situation of the Chinese elites, that does not
mean that they were wrong at their own time. Moreover, it is one thing to try to show
that there is no localism in China, but quite another to account for political tensions
which arise from the perception of an unstoppable rise of localist attitudes at the heart
of the central government. The author clings to his definition of “localism” as meaning
“to be a native of the same place where one holds office”, that is “to have been born
there”. But is this form of localism the expression of a type of political representation,
or of “identity” representation in the manner of the territory-based guanxi (tongxiang
guanxi)?  Does  it  seek  the  representation  of  provincial  units  or  of  particular
personalities? For example, when the leader of Shandong province, Wu Guanzheng, was
appointed to the central committee, was this on account of his economic performance
and/or  his  guanxi connections,  or  was  it  his  position  as  the  representative  of  the
economically prosperous province of Shandong which really counted? Similarly, was Li
Changchun appointed in his day for his personal qualities, or because he represented
Henan? The latter view is dubious, because Henan is neither rich nor prosperous and
has been under-represented in the central institutions ever since 1949, except some
periods  under  Maoist  rule.  To  take  another  instance,  when  a  well-known  and
charismatic  provincial  leader  is  removed  from  power,  his  position  as  provincial
representative is not automatically filled by another. Such was the case of Tan Shaowen
in 1993. His successor on the Tianjin city council, Gao Dezhan, did not immediately take
over the deceased leader’s seat on the politburo. 
8 All  these  examples  show  that  the  over-  or  under-representation  of  the  native
inhabitants of a province within the political institutions need to be analysed in a less
quantitative manner, taking account of more qualitative aspects. For a local cadre the
essential  requirement  is  to  possess  both  a  solid  regional  base,  fed by  local  guanxi 
connections and supported by a body of shared political experience, and a network of
trust built on these two factors. This makes it difficult to distinguish “mobility” from
territorial  guanxi connections,  because  even  when  localism  can  be  proven,  it  also
reflects the role of “professional” concerns (which are sometimes predominant) that
the appointee should have learnt his political skills within the local situation. Contrary
to  Bo  Zhiyue’s  basic  thesis,  performance  and  guanxi connections  are  not  separate
sources of support but interconnected ones. Together they make up the local cadres’
real power base. There are not, on one side, technocrats free of guanxi relations and, on
the other side, non-skilled cadres only appointed through informal connections. 
9 Moreover,  the data provided by Bo Yizhue do not give us any way of assessing the
overall pattern of political mobility in the careers of the provincial leaders. What is
lacking is the complete analysis of the movement from the centre to the regions, but
also from the provinces and townships to Peking. And yet it is this movement between
centre and periphery throughout their careers which should be seen as playing a key
role in the way they build up their networking contacts across the political structure.
In this context we can also understand why the Peking authorities are encountering
increasing resistance from the provincial leaders against the experts “parachuted in”
by  the  central  government.  Li  Cheng  has  summed  up  this  situation:  “the  tension
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between  a  struggle  against  localism  on  the  one  hand,  and  local  demands  that  the
regions  be  fully  represented on the other,  has  become the stake in  a  real  political
contest”.
10 Finally, contradicting the work of Yang Dali which attempts to show the differences
between the provinces in their relationship to Peking7, Bo Zhiyue rejects the view that
such localities as Shanghai, Hubei and Guangdong employ different strategies in their
dealings  with  the  central  government.  But  in  that  case,  how  could  the  under-
representation of a rich province like Guangdong be accounted for? While no precise
information on the real  extent of  the contribution of  that province to the national
budget is provided, here and there one comes across analyses suggesting fluctuations in
the levels of its political representation in Peking which bear no relation to the sums
accumulated  and  passed  on.  As  the  driving  force  behind  the  economic  reforms,
Guangdong only achieved substantial representation on the central committee after
1997. Despite these reservations, one cannot but agree with Bo Zhiyue when he writes,
“the State is more firmly centralised than ever .... Any initiative which crosses Peking’s
path will  be blocked by the central government and redirected towards reinforcing
central power in the country”.
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